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Abstract
In this paper we identify how changes in the income tax rate affect
the labour supply under interdependent utility functions. To reach that
aim we create a model of the economy in which households choosing
their optimal labour supply take into account not only their income,
tax rate and individual consumption but also so called relative con-
sumption level (see Garbicz 1997). Taking into account the last issue
we significantly modify the well known Becker model (1965).
We conduct a comparative statics exercise using na lattice and su-
permodular game theory. Thanks to which we show sufficient and
necessary conditions for a labour supply to be monotonic function of
the income tax rate. We analyze the economic behaviour under static
and dynamic setup.
Under quite general assumptions concerning the household utility
function we show that the higher the tax rate the lower the macroeco-
nomic labour supply. Additionally we show the possibility of multiple
equilibria in the economy that offers the explanation of differences in
the working time between e.g. European countries and the US as well
as discrepancies between micro and macroeconomic elasticity of labour
supply (see Alesina, Glaeser, and Sacerdote 2005).
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1 Introduction
Certain behavioural assumptions are necessary to model households’ labour
supply decisions. From Becker (1965) onwards it has been assumed as a rule,
that households maximize utility over joint consumptions of goods, services
and leisure, subject to budget and time constraints. This model includes
however one dubious assumption suggesting that consumers care exclusively
for the absolute consumption level. Empirical studies (Zizzo 2003) indicates
that social environment exerts enormous influence on attitude and behaviour
of an average household. Economic, social and political preferences are not
after all accidental but in most cases socially predefined. The consumers
buy many goods because they want to behave like those who are considered
authority in the field of fashion, spending free time or other consumer cus-
toms. They strive to equal other agents, to find their respect, recognition
and acceptance but above all, they want to avoid the threat of social exclu-
sion. Therefore, reducing human consumption motives only to maximization
of absolute level of consumption does not seem to be justified. Consumer
reactions, basing on relative level of wealth or poverty, could be also very
important (Sobel 2005). That is why both motives (relative as well as ab-
solute consumption) are taken into account, even though their weight can
be arguable. The paper attempts to modify the traditional model of labour
supply with respect to social aspects of human behaviour.
We present the modified labour supply model using relative consump-
tion as an additional argument of the household’s utility function. In com-
parison with Garbicz (1997), who presented the discussed idea, this paper
includes (i) endogenization of the relative consumption, (ii) transformation
of the whole analysis to a dynamic context, (iii) generalizing analyzed util-
ity functions to a class of functions. Two cases are examined: (a) strategic
complementarity, and (b) strategic substitutability, in which the households
react to the increase of consumption of the reference group with increase or
decrease of its own propensity to consumption, respectively. In this way this
paper delivers quite robust conclusions concerning the influence of relative
consumption on households labour supply.
The traditional model of labour supply does not imply any interdepen-
dence between consumers. If individual households behaviour is a conse-
quence only of the aspiration to maximize their own, absolute consumption,
the social environment does not exert any influence on the consumer’s opti-
mum. Under these conditions analysis of individual households’ behaviours
can be conducted independently and in the spirit of the representative agent.
When we add the relative consumption to the household’s utility function
(with an appropriate weight), we change not only the set of arguments of
the function but above all it requires the entirely different approach to the
modeling of household’s behaviour. It is no more plausible to determine the
market demand by simple adding up of the individual optima. The idea of
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the representative agent has to be rejected. In the new situation households
are involved in a strategic game with other subjects, which leads to a Nash
equilibrium. In such a market structure agents’ behaviours can be comple-
mentary. It means that households will increase their own consumption as a
reaction to the increase of the consumption of other households (and expand
working time – reducing leisure). The shape of the reaction curve can how-
ever lead to multiple Nash equilibria on the labour market. This situation is
intuitively easy to understand. For if individual household assigns high rank
to the relative level of consumption (main desire to be like others), and low
to the absolute level of consumptions, all consumers (households) can choose
together either high level of consumption and short leisure time or low level
of the absolute consumption (and long leisure time). Historical experience,
customs, cultural norms and the exogenous shock could determine whether
the system achieves high or low level of consumption.
We use this pattern of households’ behaviour to examine the influence of
income tax changes on the amount of labour supply. If the household seeks
its optimum – taking into account only the absolute level of consumption –
the increase of taxation levied on work results in most cases in a decrease
of the labour supply, since this situation is equivalent to the reduction of
real wages. The only exception to this rule is the backwards-bending labour
supply curve, but this case is unlikely for the wide class of utility functions.
In case of relative consumption the situation looks different. Changes in the
tax rates have the nature of exogenous shocks. This kind of shock starts
the process of interdependent adjustments of households to the new state
of equilibrium. At the same time, shifts of behaviour of some households
modify conditions of the optimization for other subjects. It is an intriguing
question whether in the described situation households will behave in the
same way as subjects in the model with the absolute level consumption.
We established in this paper two essential facts concerning this issue.
First of all, quite general assumptions concerning the household’s utility
function allow conclusion that the increase of fiscal charges results in de-
crease of labour supply on the macroeconomic level. In principle it confirms
current conclusions of economic theory. On the other hand, the potential
existence of multiple equilibria on labour market gives us the possible expla-
nation of the differences in the length of working time in European countries
and the USA. The reasons of this phenomenon are currently a subject of in-
tensive studies and disputes. Empirical examinations (e.g. Alesina, Glaeser,
and Sacerdote 2005) are suggesting that almost whole difference in the level
of GDP per capita between Western Europe and the US can be assigned
to the duration of working time1. The differences in labour productivity
per hour are minimal between countries mentioned above. Prescott (2004)
1Europe in comparison with the US is characterized by shorter working week, longer
leave and higher unemployment.
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assigns shorter working time in Europe to higher taxation. Other authors
point out that the sources of this phenomena are institutional factors in the
labour market (see Alesina, Glaeser, and Sacerdote 2005). Finally, we can
find “cultural” explanation - suggesting that Europeans work less, because
it matches better their aspiration and norms of behaviour. This paper is re-
ferring to the current of thought, represented by the conception of the social
multiplier (Glaeser, Sacerdote, and Scheinkman 2002). This idea is based on
the observation (e.g. Sobel 2005) that in the world of social interactions the
individual tendency to behave in certain way is strengthened, when others
behave alike. The authors call this phenomenon – social multiplier. There
is a close analogy between the social multiplier and the model of the be-
haviour of agents involved in the strategic game presented in our article.
Glaeser’s paper however does not concentrate on the behaviours of house-
holds which influence the labour supply; it is more general in the character.
The present paper is more specific in this particular area (independently of
the different language and approach to modeling). Allowing the existence
of possible multiple equillibria of market system means, that people (even
equipped with the same utility functions) can choose both long working time
(i.e. high consumption of goods and the short relaxation) if this is the way
the others behave, as well as short working time (i.e. the low consumption of
goods and the long leisure time) if such social pattern is typical. Under such
condition it is plausible to talk about the importance of inertia of the system
to tax changes. We can believe that culture norms are responsible for such
community conduct. It means that the tax rates leveling will not necessarily
be enough to get the analogous result in the US and Western Europe. The
text shows that in order to break the existing inertia the system can require
more fundamental tax changes, i.e. such changes, which would raze the mul-
tiple equilibria and substitute them with one state being characterized by
a high level of the working time. Finally the discussed inertia can also ex-
plain discrepancies in labour supply elasticities between countries as well as
between the micro and macro level (Alesina, Glaeser, and Sacerdote 2005).
The rest of the paper is organized in the following way: chapter 2 in-
troduces the basic model of single household’s choice of the labour sup-
ply (Becker 1965); it points out necessary and sufficient conditions for the
increase (decrease) of labour supply as the consequence of the reduction
(rise) of a tax rate. In chapter 3 we extend the preferences of households
including the relative consumption in order to examine how the analyzed
situation changes after taking the relative consumption into consideration;
we show appropriate conditions, for the increase (drop) of labour supply
with the cuts (increases) in tax rates. Chapter 3.1 presents conclusions con-
cerning comparative statics. In chapter 3.2 we examined the dynamics of
the labour supply of given group of households resulting from the changes
in the tax rate. The paper ends with conclusions (chapter 4) and proofs of
the theorems (chapter 5).
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2 One household economy
In this section we examine the household’s reaction on changes in the income
tax rate. To reach that aim we present the necessary and sufficient conditions
for the optimal choice of labour supply to be a monotonic function of the
income tax rate.
Consider a single household with its preferences represented by a real-
valued utility function: U(c, r) where c ∈ R+ ∪ {0} represents consumption
level and r ∈ [0, 1] time spend on leisure2. The rest of the time l = 1− r is
spend on work. Household faces the budget constraint: w(1−r)(1−θ)+t = c,
where w ∈ R+ represents the wage level, t ∈ R+ ∪ {0} other income while
parameter θ ∈ [0, 1) = Θ stands for the income tax3. We assume that
the preferences do not change during the analysis period and w, t, θ are
exogenous parameters. We assume also that U is a increasing function of r
and c.
Households solves the following problem:
max
c,r
U(c, r),
u.c. w(1− r)(1− θ) + t = c. (2.1)
Using the budget constraint we get:
U(c, r) = U(w(1− r)(1− θ) + t, r) ≡ F (r, θ),
where for simplicity we have reformulated the utility function to: F (r, θ) ≡
U(w(1 − r)(1 − θ) + t, r). Now the optimization problem (see (2.1)) takes
the form of:
max
r∈[0,1]
F (r, θ), (2.2)
where θ is a parameter. The fall of θ (decrease in the tax rate) may result in
increase as well as decrease in the optimal leisure choice (decrease as well as
increase in labour supply). These two cases are presented in graph 1. Below
we show the necessary and sufficient conditions for the optimal labour supply
to be a monotonic function of the tax rate.
Let the R∗θ (with elements r
∗(θ)) denote the set of solutions of the max-
imization problem (2.2) for the parameter θ. Put differently: R∗θ = {r : r =
arg maxr F (r, θ), θ ∈ Θ∗}, where Θ∗ = {θ ∈ Θ : R∗θ 6= ∅}. The following
theorem gives the necessary and sufficient conditions for the set R∗θ to be
ascending4 on Θ∗.
2For simplicity we normalize the time available to 1, where r denotes the proportion of
time spend on leisure.
3We skip the case of θ = 1 as trivial.
4Following e.g. Topkis (1998) we use terms: ascending, descending, increasing and
decreasing in their weak sense.
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Figure 1: On the fall of θ household may react with increase (I → II) or
decrease (I → II ′) labour supply.
Theorem 2.1 Function F (r, θ) satisfy the single crossing property (SCP)
i.e. ∀θ < θ′, r < r′:
F (r, θ) ≤ F (r′, θ) ⇒ F (r, θ′) ≤ F (r′, θ′), (2.3)
F (r, θ) < F (r′, θ) ⇒ F (r, θ′) < F (r′, θ′), (2.4)
iff. the set of R∗θ is ascending on Θ
∗.
Single crossing property means that: if for some θ it is (weakly) profitable to
increase leisure from r to r′ then it should as well hold for the higher value
of the parameter: θ′. From theorem 2.1 we know that SCP is sufficient and
necessary condition for the set of R∗θ to be ascending on Θ
∗.
Sufficient and necessary condition for the set of maximal solutions (R∗θ)
to be descending shows the following theorem:
Theorem 2.2 Function F (r, θ) satisfies the reverse single crossing property
(RSCP) i.e. ∀θ < θ′, r < r′:
F (r′, θ) ≤ F (r, θ) ⇒ F (r′, θ′) ≤ F (r, θ′), (2.5)
F (r′, θ) < F (r, θ) ⇒ F (r′, θ′) < F (r, θ′), (2.6)
iff. the set R∗θ is descending on Θ
∗.
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Reverse single crossing property means that if for some θ it is (weakly)
profitable to decrease the leisure choice from r′ to r then it should as well
hold for the higher value of the parameter θ′. From the theorem 2.2 we get
that it is necessary and sufficient condition for set R∗θ to be descending on
Θ∗.
Let’s stress that theorems 2.1 and 2.2 do not require the function F to
be concave neither the maximal solution to be non corner one.
In the case of multiple solutions of the maximization problem (2.2) theo-
rems 2.1 and 2.2 say only that single crossing property (RSCP respectively)
is necessary and sufficient condition for the set of maximizers R∗θ to be as-
cending (descending), i.e. the maximal and minimal selections r∗(θ) to be
increasing (decreasing) with θ. These theorems do not say, however, any-
thing on the monotonocity of the “middle” solutions. There are two ways
to reach stronger results: to constraint the set of solutions by adding the
convexity assumption of F (see theorem 2.3) or to add stronger assumptions
on the reaction of F on changes in θ and r (see theorem 2.4).
Theorem 2.3 If the function F (r, θ) is strictly concave with respect to r on
[0, 1] then the problem (2.2) has only one global maximum.
The concavity assumption of F (r, θ) within the C 2 class is satisfied if Ucc <
0, Urr < 0 and Ucr > 0. However outside this class these are not the neces-
sary conditions.
Joining together theorems 2.1 (or 2.2) and 2.3 we get conditions for the
only solution of (2.2) to be increasing (or decreasing) with θ.
Theorem 2.4 gives conditions for the every selection of the optimal labour
supply to be an increasing function of the tax rate without the concavity
assumptions of F i.e. allowing for multiple solutions of 2.2.
Theorem 2.4 Consider the utility function U of class C 2. If the following
condition holds:
∂U(c, r)
∂c
+ (1− r)
(
w(1− θ)∂
2U
∂c2
− ∂
2U
∂c∂r
)
> 0 (2.7)
then every r∗(θ) is strictly increasing on Θ∗. If we substitute > with < in
inequality (2.7) then every r∗(θ) will be strictly decreasing on Θ∗.
Theorem 2.4 says that if the inequality (2.7) is satisfied growth of θ would
result in the increase of optimal choice(-es) of r i.e. the decrease of labour
supply l (if the solutions of (2.2) exist).
If the inequality (2.7) is satisfied and only one solution of (2.2) exists
theorem 2.4 implies, that after the growth in the tax rate labour supply will
decrease. In the case of multiple solutions theorem says only that all of the
optimal r∗ will move monotonically with the parameter.
To sum up: for the concave F (e.g. for Ucc < 0, Urr < 0 and Urc > 0
where U is C 2) there is only one solution of the optimization problem,
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which increases with the increase in the tax rate when the condition (2.7)
is satisfied. When we substitute > with < in the inequality (2.7) labour
supply will be an increasing function of the tax rate. And finally when the
inequality (2.7) changes signs for rˆ(θ) ∈ [0, 1] further change in the tax rate
would result with the opposite move of labour supply.
We will finish this section with the following example using the above
theorems:
Example 2.1
Consider a real Cobb-Douglas utility function: U(c, r) = cαrβ, where
α, β > 0. The corresponding F function takes the form of: F (r, θ) =
rβ(t+ (1− r)(1− θ)w)α. Using the Spence-Mirrlees condition (see Milgrom
and Shannon 1994) for analyzing single crossing property and theorem 2.1
we have that the set of the optimal solutions R∗θ is ascending with θ. We
may check this result by calculating the labour supply function: l∗(θ) ≡
1 − r∗(θ) = 1 − αα+β
(
t
w(1−θ) + 1
)
and noticing that l∗(θ) strictly decreases
with θ.
We shall add the ordinal conditions given in theorem 2.4 are very general
although often not easily implementable. 
The next section generalizes this results for the I-household economy
with interdependent preferences.
3 Multi household economy
In this section we analyze how the above results change when a given house-
hold cares about so called relative consumption level, i.e. we assume that
each household cares not only about its own consumption level but also
consumption of all the other households.
Consider I ∈ N single households, any (denoted i, where i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , I})
represented by the utility function: Ui(ci, ri, c−i), where ci ∈ R+ ∪ {0}, ri ∈
[0, 1] denote consumption level and leisure time of household i while c−i =
[c1, c2, . . . , ci−1, ci+1, . . . , cI ] vector of the consumption levels of all the other
households. Each household faces the budget constraint given by: wi(1 −
ri)(1− θ) + ti = ci. The income tax rate is the same for all agents: ∀i θi =
θ ∈ [0, 1) = Θ. We assume also that: li = 1 − ri and preferences do not
change during the period of our analysis. We treat wi, ti, θ as exogenous
parameters. Each household i treats c−i as given and solves:
max
ci,ri
U(ci, ri, c−i),
u.c. wi(1− ri)(1− θ) + ti = ci. (3.8)
Using the budget constraint we reformulate the utility function:
Fi(ri, r−i, θ) ≡ Ui((1− θ)(1− ri)wi + ti, ri,∀ j 6= i (1− θ)(1− rj)wj + tj),
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where r−i = [r1, r2, . . . , ri−1, ri+1, . . . , rI ] denotes the vector of time devoted
to relax by households other then i.
Reformulating the analyzed model under game theoretic approach we get
a game Γ between I players with strategies (ri, r−i) = [0, 1]I and the payoff
function Fi for each i. The solution of (3.8) for any agent corresponds to
Nash equilibria of Γ.
We will analyze this game in a static and dynamic framework to find out
how changes in the tax rate influence the behaviour of the economy under
study.
3.1 Static setup
Similarly to one household economy we will find the conditions under which
the set of optimal solutions (Nash equilibria of Γ) is monotonic with respect
to θ.
Theorem 3.1 (Equilibria under complementarities) If for each i the
following holds:
(a) for any r−i and θ function Fi is upper semicontinuous5 with respect to
ri on [0, 1],
(b) for any θ function Fi has increasing differences6 on ri and r−i,
then:
(i) the set of Nash equilibria of Γ in pure strategies is a nonempty com-
plete lattice7 and has its greatest and least element reached by iterated
deletion of strictly dominated strategies,
(ii) if in addition for any i and given r−i function F has increasing (de-
creasing) differences8 on ri and θ then the greatest and least Nash
equilibrium in pure strategies is increasing (decreasing) with θ,
(iii) if in addition in (b) we assume strictly increasing differences, ∀i ti =
t, wi = w and that the payoff functions are the same for each player
(game is symmetric), then the game do not have any asymmetric Nash
equilibrium.
Condition (a) allows for upward jumps in F only. Any continues function
satisfies this condition. Point (b) says that the payoff function should have
5I.e. for any sequence rni : lim suprni ↓inf(rni )F (r
n
i , r−i, θ) ≤ F (inf(rni ), r−i, θ) and
lim suprni ↑sup(rni )F (r
n
i , r−i, θ) ≤ F (sup(rni ), r−i, θ).
6I.e. ∀ri < r′i i ∀r−i < r′−i F (ri, r−i, θ)− F (r′i, r−i, θ) ≤ F (ri, r′−i, θ)− F (r′i, r′−i, θ).
7Partially ordered set X is a lattice iff. ∀x, y ∈ X x ∨ y ∈ X 3 x ∧ y. Lattice X is
complete if for each nonempty T ⊂ X: infX(T ) ∈ X and supX(T ) ∈ X.
8I.e. ∀ri < r′i and ∀θ < θ′ F (ri, r−i, θ)− F (r′i, r−i, θ) ≤ F (ri, r−i, θ′)− F (r′i, r−i, θ′).
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increasing differences on ri and r−i, i.e. strategies ri and r−i are complemen-
tary. (Strict) complementarity means that the marginal utility of i must be
increasing (strictly) with respect to the other players’ strategies.
(Strict) increasing differences in (b) under the differentiable U takes the
form of:
∀i 6= j (1− θ)wi ∂
2Ui
∂ci∂cj
− ∂
2Ui
∂ri∂cj
(>) ≥ 0, (3.9)
while (strictly) increasing differences condition in (ii) is equivalent to9:
∀i∀r−i ∂
2F
∂ri∂θ
≥ (≤)0. (3.10)
Let’s begin from interpretation of the condition set on differences of Fi with
respect to ri and r−i, i.e. if Ui is twice differentiable:
∀i∀r−i∀j 6= i (1− θ)2wjwi ∂
2Ui
∂ci∂cj
− (1− θ)wj ∂
2Ui
∂ri∂cj
. (3.11)
This term describes the change in household’s marginal utility (∂Ui∂ri − (1−
θ)wi ∂Ui∂ci ) resulting from the increase of leisure time choices of all the other
households. Put differently increasing differences of Fi between (ri, r−i)
(compare with (3.11)) says how the net increase in the utility function from
reallocating the unit of labour to leisure time (and loosing this way some
consumption) changes with resect to the choices of leisure time of the other
households. Under twice differential Ui the direction of i-household reaction
to changes in the decision of the others (i.e. expression (3.11)) is determined
by the sign of the expression:
(1− θ)wi ∂
2Ui
∂ci∂cj
− ∂
2Ui
∂ri∂cj
. (3.12)
When the above term is positive i-household is more willing to devote more
time for leisure (consume less) when the others increase their leisure choices
(decrease consumption levels). We say that strategies of i and−i are comple-
mentary. And the opposite under decreasing returns (when expression (3.12)
is negative) we say about substitutive strategies of i and −i.
The assumption of complementarities (in theorem 3.1) can be explained
the following way. Taking into account so called relative consumption level
9This is rather strong condition because θ is not only present in ci but also in c−i. This
assumption can be, however, reformulated using the corresponding game Γ′ with payoffs:
F ′i (ci, c−i, θ) = Ui(ci, 1− ci−tiwi(1−θ) , c−i). Theorem 3.1 holds then for (a) upper semicontin-
uous Ui with (b) increasing differences on ci and c−i (all the same in Γ and Γ′). Condition
(ii) takes a simpler form of: ∀i∀r−i ∂2Ui∂ci∂θ ≤ (≥)0 (compare with inequality (2.7)).
Simpler conditions on U to reach the results in theorem 3.1 result from the fact that
theorem gives sufficient but not necessary conditions for the comparative statics results.
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Figure 2: The set of Nash equilibria of Γ is ascending under complementarity.
the increase of −i households consumption choices will not improve the i
relative situation. This way such a change would increase i inclination to
increase its consumption as well.
Point (i) in theorem 3.1 guarantees existence of at least one Nash equi-
librium of Γ (i.e. equilibrium of the analyzed economy) and describes the
structure of the equilibrium set. Additionally when the assumption in (ii)
is satisfied (in differential case inequality (3.10 holds) with10 >) theorem
says how the economy reacts to changes in the tax rate θ: each household’s
inclination to enlarge leisure time will raise and this will incline (through
complementarity) the others to raise their leisure choices as well. The set of
Nash equilibria of Γ will ascend, i.e. the greatest and least Nash equilibrium
will growth with θ. It cannot be implied however that the middle equilibria
will increase as well.
Figure 2 shows household i best response correspondence to rj for a sym-
metric game Γ. The fact that the correspondence in increasing shows that
complementarity assumption is satisfied. And the fact that this correspon-
dence moved up after the change from θ1 to θ2 shows that F has increasing
differences on (ri, θ). The analyzed economy has 3 symmetric equilibria (and
has no asymmetric ones). Growth in parameter θ results in the increase of
the greatest and least equilibrium. However the middle equilibrium declines.
10Compare with (2.7).
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Note that at this stage we cannot surely say that after the growth of
the tax rate (under complementarity and increasing differences on (r, θ) the
labour supply will decline because middle equilibria of unknown monotonic-
ity may exist. In addition when a few equilibria exist economy may jump
from the chosen equilibrium to some other after the change in θ; as a result
households may change the equilibrium from one (e.g. with higher leisure
and lower labour supply) to another (e.g with lower leisure and higher labour
supply) even if all equilibria increase after the change in θ. Conditions ex-
cluding such cases will be presented in section 3.2.
Before that we will analyze the case of substitutive strategies.
Theorem 3.2 (Equilibria under substitutive strategies) If for each i
the following holds:
(a) for any r−i and θ function Fi is continuous with respect to ri in [0, 1]
and
(b) for any θ function Fi has decreasing differences on ri and r−i,
then:
(i) the game has at least one Nash equilibrium,
(ii) if additionally the game is symmetric, for each i and any given r−i
function Fi has increasing (decreasing) differences on ri and θ and we
assume strictly decreasing differences in (b) then Γ has only one sym-
metric Nash equilibrium. This equilibrium is increasing (decreasing)
with θ.
Under twice differentiable Ui decreasing differences assumption can be checked
using the following inequality:
(1− θ)w ∂
2U
∂ci∂cj
− ∂
2U
∂ri∂cj
≤ 0. (3.13)
Substitutive strategies mean that the increase in leisure time (decrease
in consumption level) by all −i households results in household i higher
inclination to decrease its leisure time choice (higher consumption). This
assumption seems rather awkward because household tend to imitate the
others behaviour (Zizzo 2003). Nevertheless it can be justified by so called
self awarding character of the alternative when households gain satisfaction
behaving differently to the others.
Point (i) in theorem 3.2 guarantees existence of at least one Nash equilib-
rium. Point (ii) says that even under substitutive strategies symmetric game
will have one symmetric equilibrium, which for increasing (decreasing) dif-
ferences with respect to r and θ will be increasing (decreasing) with θ. Under
12
rj
φj(ri, θ)
φi(rj , θ)
ri
1
45◦
Figure 3: Under substitutive strategies asymmetric equilibria may be present
in a symmetric game. In such a game only one symmetric equilibrium exists,
monotonic with θ.
substitutive strategies there is a possibility of multiple asymmetric equilib-
ria to occur even in symmetric games (which was impossible under strict
complementarities). This result should not be surprising, however, because
of substitutive strategies themselves. More interestingly despite substitutive
strategies monotonic symmetric equilibrium exists. That is: under increas-
ing differences with respect to r and θ increase in the tax rate may result
in a decrease in labour supply of all the households; substitution effect of
a change in labour supply will be outweighed by the complementary effect
between change in the tax rate and leisure choice). Figure 3 exemplifies this
results. In addition, it shows that condition in theorem 3.1 are not necessary
for a growth of r∗ with θ.
Figure 4 shows that in a game with substitutive strategies growth in θ
may result in a increase of labour supply (I → III) of all the households. It
is possible, however, that some part of households react with increase and
some with decrease (when substitution effect outweigh the complementary
effect) in labour supply (I → II). Sum of this reactions both may result in
a growth or decline in the aggregated labour supply.
Comparing one with multi household economy we may draw some in-
teresting conclusions. Condition (2.7) satisfied for each player is no longer
sufficient for a growth in labour supply after a decline in the tax rate. Even
complementarities condition does not guarantee this result. The choice of
the greatest or least equilibrium and guarantee that the economy will not
13
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φi(rj , θ3)
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φj(ri, θ3)
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φj(ri, θ)
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Figure 4: Under substitutive strategies households may all decrease their
labour supply (I → III) after growth of θ as well as some of them may
increase while some may decrease their labour supply (I → II).
jump from higher to the lower equilibrium are necessary for the result to
hold. Finally we may say that growth in labour supply after increase in the
tax rate is more likely in a multi household economy.
Asymmetric equilibria in symmetric games are possible only under sub-
stitutive strategies. Asymmetric equilibria for a homogenous players mean
that each of identical players taking into account the others behaviour may
react differently to the change in θ. The aggregated effect of this changes is
ambiguous.
For a heterogenous agents the fall of labour supply after growth in the tax
rate is certain only for greatest or least equilibria under complementarities,
increasing differences between r and θ and relevant dynamic of the economy.
We shall end this section with one more theorem concerning the set of
equilibria of Γ when the number of players changes.
Theorem 3.3 Consider game Γ with N players with strategies rn ∈ [0, 1]
and payoffs Fn(rn, r−n, θ) defined earlier. If for each n ∈ N , any θ and r−n
the following holds:
• Fn is upper semicontinuous,
• Fn has increasing differences on rn and r−n,
then for any i ∈ I where ∅ 6= I ⊂ N its strategies in greatest and least
equilibrium of Γ increase with I.
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Increase in the number of players under complementary strategies will result
in the growth of the greatest and least equilibrium.
Example 3.2
Consider economy composed of I households, each represented by utility
function: Ui(ci, ri, c−i) = cαi r
β
i
(P
j 6=i cj
I−1
)γ
, where α, β > 0. Because mono-
tonic transformation of U will not changer qualitative results we will create
a new function: U˜i(ci, ri, c−i) = lnUi(ci, ri, c−i). Using remarks from the
footnote 9 increasing differences of U˜i (on ci, c−i) condition is always satis-
fied. In addition U˜i has strictly increasing differences on (ci,−θ). As a result
the set of Nash equilibria of the economy is nonempty complete lattice with
greatest and least equilibrium, that (ri) increase with θ. For identical players
our economy does not have asymmetric equilibria. Notice that the results
are independent of the sign of γ, i.e. positive of negative influence of the
relative consumption on a players i utility.
To specify: the economy has only one Nash equilibrium because best
response correspondences are constant. 
3.2 Dynamic setup
The results (reached in the previous section) concerning comparative statics
exercise under complementary and substitutive strategies does not rule out
the possibility of multiple equilibria to occur. Under multiplicity we have
shown the possibility of equilibria moving in the opposite direction to the
changes in parameter’s value. In addition we have not ruled out the pos-
sibility that the economy jumps out from the chosen equilibrium after the
change in parameter.
This section defines the dynamics of the economy in order to analyze the
stability of equilibria in Γ. It will allow us to eliminate the cases described
in the previous paragraph.
We shall start from defining (see Echenique 2002) dynamics of the econ-
omy and as well its stability:
Definition 3.1 Let φ : X → X be a correspondence, where X is a lattice.
A sequence {xk} in X is called generalized adaptive dynamics from φ if
there is some γ ∈ N such that xk ∈ [φ(inf Hγk ), φ¯(supHγk )] for each k ≥ 1,
where Hγk denotes the history of length γ at time k: H = {xk−γ , . . . , xk−1}
and φ = inf(φ(x)), φ¯ = sup(φ(x)) for any x. Let D(x0, φ) be the set of all
sequences that are generalized adaptive dynamics from φ starting at x0.
Generalized adaptive dynamics from φ rule out moves, that cannot be“justi-
fied” be a response to some history. It does not have to be, however, the best
response to a previous move neither the moves should equally exactly the
best response for a given history. An important case of generalized adaptive
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dynamics is the set of simple adaptive dynamics:
A(x0, φ) = {{xk}∞k=0 : xk ∈ φ(xk−1), k ≥ 1},
a la taˆtonnement.
Definition 3.2 Let φ : X → X be a correspondence. A point xˆ ∈ X is best
case stable if there is a neighborhood O of xˆ in X such that for all x ∈ O
there is a sequence {xk} ∈ D(x0, φ) with xk → xˆ. A point xˆ ∈ X is worst
case stable if there is a neighborhood O of xˆ in X, such that for all x ∈ O
and all sequences {xk} ∈ D(x0, φ), xk → xˆ.
Using the above definitions and denoting ε(θ) the set of equilibria of Γ for
θ we get:
Theorem 3.4 (On stability of equilibria) Consider game Γ such that
for each player its payoff function Fi is upper semicontinuous with respect
to ri for a given θ and r−i, has increasing differences on (ri, r−i) for each θ
and strictly increasing differences on (ri, θ) for any r−i. If
(a)  is a continuous correspondence Θ on {ε(θ) : θ ∈ Θ} and
(b)  is nowhere increasing [θ, θ¯] ⊂ Θ
then for any θ ∈ [θ, θ¯] (θ) is not best case stable. If we substitute point (b)
with:
(b’)  is strictly increasing on [θ, θ¯] ⊂ Θ and (θ) is isolated11 in θ
then (θ) is worst case stable.
Theorem says that for a game with complementary strategies and strictly
increasing differences on ri and θ and continuous moves of equilibrium: if
after the increase in parameter equilibrium increased (decreased) this equi-
librium is stable (unstable). Because of the fact that for continuous strategy
spaces probability that the economy will end up in a unstable equilibrium
is zero, growth of labour supply after growth in the tax rate (moving down
with the middle equilibrium) is no longer possible. Therefore any unstable
equilibrium is not a point of rest but rather the point that divides basins of
attraction between two stable equilibria.
Theorem 3.5 (see Echenique 2002) describes how the economy will behave
when shifted “upwards” (e.g. with the growth of θ):
Theorem 3.5 Let φ : X → X, where X = [0, 1]I be a best response cor-
respondence under complementarity. If X 3 x  inf φ(x) then F (x, φ) =
{z ∈ X : ∃{xk} ∈ D(x, φ), z = limk xk} is nonempty with the least element:
inf F (x, φ) = inf{z ∈ ε : x  z} oraz inf F (x, φ) ∈ ε.
11I.e. there is a neighborhood O of (θ) that O ∩ ε(θ) = {(θ)}, i.e. it is the only one
equilibrium in this neighborhood.
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1
rθ1l r
θ2
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l r
θ2
h
φi(rj , θ1)
φi(rj , θ2)
45◦
Figure 5: With the growth in θ two new equilibria emerge. Their stability
cannot be implied from the changes in the tax rate between θ1 and θ2. We
may imply only that the equilibrium rl is stable.
Put differently when the economy is in some point x but lower than the best
response correspondence value at this point it will converge to an equilib-
rium that lays higher than x. Therefore when the economy is in equilibrium
growth in θ cannot result in the fall of r. To interpret: under complemen-
tarities and increasing differences on (ri, θ) growth in the tax rate cannot
result in the growth in labour supply12. It is because of the fact that basin
of attraction of the greatest equilibrium is enlarging (unstable equilibrium
is moving down). It means that whatever equilibrium (stable or unstable)
the economy is in before the change in the tax rate the labour supply will
not growth when the tax rate increases.
In figure 2 the middle equilibrium is unstable. It divides the basins of
attraction between greatest and least equilibrium. If the economy will fall
into one of these basins it will converge to its equilibrium.
In theorem 3.4 the condition that (θ) is isolated in some neighborhood is
to exclude the case of continuum of equilibria. It this case we cannot imply
how the economy will behave. The condition that equilibrium selection is
continuous with θ is designed to exclude equilibria that emerge or disappear
after the change in θ (compare with the case on figure 5). Note that this
12We have excluded this way the possibility of downward jumps between equilibria when
the parameter growths.
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rj
φi(rj , θ) 1
45◦
Figure 6: Under symmetric substitutive strategies despite increase of a sym-
metric equilibrium with θ it is unstable for taˆtonnement dynamics.
theorem is no longer necessary for the results under substitutive strategies.
Counterexample is shown in the figure 6.
The last example shows the possible consequences of multiplicity of equi-
libria and their monotonicity with the tax rate.
Example 3.3
Consider the utility function: U(ci, ri, c−i) =
(
λci − (1− λ)
(P
j 6=i cj
I−1
)2)α
rβi .
Suppose that: α = 1/3, β = 2/3, λ = 9/10, wi = 10 i ti = 1. For simplicity
and to enable graphical representation we assume that I = 2. For this given
values of parameters we face complementary strategies. In addition U has
increasing differences on (ci,−θ) (see footnote 9).
Suppose that we start under the tax rate of 13%. Than our economy
has 3 symmetric equilibria with the following consumption levels 5.4, 8.1
i 9.7 (and corresponding labour supply li: 0.5, 0.8, 1). After the growth
of the tax rate up to 17% all equilibria move down to: 4.8, 8.7 and 9.3
(corresponding labour supplies move down to li: 0.46, 0.9, 1). It means that
that the set of Nash equilibria has descended while the set of equilibrium ri
ascended (see figure 7). The middle equilibrium (II and II ′) is unstable for
any generalized adaptive dynamics.
For tax rates of 13%, 17% and all in between the state of our economy
is undetermined: we cannot a priori say which equilibrium the economy is
in.
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cj
φi(cj , θ)
I
II
III
I ′
II ′
III ′
I ′′
5.4
8.1
9.7
4.8
8.7
9.3
4.0
θ = 13%
θ = 17%
θ = 25%
45◦
Figure 7: Best response function (of consumption i) for a given consumption
level of −i. For θ = 13% (and θ = 17%) the game has three symmetric
Nash equilibria: I,II i III (I ′,II ′ i III ′). For θ = 25% there is only one
equilibrium: I ′′.
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For the tax rate of 25% there is only one symmetric equilibrium with
consumption level of 4 (corresponding li: 0.4). 
The results reached in the example 3.2 may be interpreted the following
way: suppose that (when θ = 13%) our economy is in equilibrium III.
After the growth in the tax rate (up to θ = 17%) households will reduce
(not increase) their labour supply (see theorem 3.5) either by moving with
equilibrium (from III to III ′) or jumping to equilibrium I ′. Assuming
however that the dynamics of our system is a la taˆtonnement, our economy
will rest in equilibrium III ′. After the next growth in the tax rate (to 25%)
the economy will end up in I ′′ whatever the earlier equilibria. Consequently
labour supply will fall down from 1 to 0.4.
Suppose now that we would like to come back the high labour supply
state: lowering the tax rate to 17% (or even 13%) may not be sufficient.
The economy may got stuck in equilibrium I ′ (I) and for changes in the tax
rate react with only small changes in labour supply (from 0.4 through 0.46
to 0.5). Only lowering of the tax rate down to 8% enforces (there is only
one equilibrium) come back to the high labour supply state.
Let us stress that this scenario is specific: after the decrease in the tax
rate (e.g. from 25% to 17%) our economy may jump to equilibrium III ′ at
once. In addition the chosen utility function and parameters value to reach
multiple equilibria seems to be rather rare e.g. change in λ for some lower
value result in only one equilibrium.
4 Conclusion
The analysis of the reaction of the labour supply changes to fiscal charges
used to be dominated by the belief that each household establishes its strat-
egy both separately and independently of other agent choices. This as-
sumption permitted simple adding up of individual households’ reactions
but it was not realistic for obvious reasons. Considering these facts, we
examined what kind of new results could be obtained assuming that house-
holds establish their behaviour strategies with respect to behaviours of other
households belonging to the same reference group. We call this situation
interdependence of preferences. We model it by including relative consump-
tion into household’s preferences (e.g. relation of own consumption to the
consumption in the reference group). Using lattice theory and the idea of
supermodular games we obtained results based on very general assumptions
concerning the shape of households utility functions. The achieved results
can be encapsulated in the following four points.
First, including household’s relative consumption in the utility function
does not fundamentally change previous general conclusions concerning the
negative impact of the increase of income tax rate on the size of the labour
supply on the macroeconomic level.
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Second, the interdependence of preferences affects strategies of house-
holds in the way that they become either substitutive or complementary
in relation to other agents’ behaviour. We believe that the case of strate-
gic complementarity seems to be typical in real world; at the same time it
has potentially very interesting consequences – as far as it leads to multiple
equilibria. The existence of multiple equilibria implies that the economy
can be characterized either by high labour supply (households choose short
leisure), or with low labour supply (households prefer long leisure). Both
these situations are possible; the empirical state is a consequence of some
exogenous factors or is due to certain path of historical development.
Third, the existence of multiple equilibria may imply that the reaction
of the economy to tax rate changes could be relatively weak. Speaking pre-
cisely: in spite of mechanism strengthening the subjects reaction to external
shocks (characteristic to the strategic complementarity), changes in labour
supply, which follow the changes in the tax rate, can be limited to little shifts
in local equilibria. It can be conditioned by the mechanism of “anchoring”
decisions of one household in the scope for activity of other subjects. The
strong inertia of the system in response to external shocks can certainly be
interpreted as a result of cultural conditioning. We do not feel competent to
discuss the legitimacy of this point of view in a detailed way. In our opinion,
the inertia of the economy is a result of certain historical factors. These fac-
tors created expectations concerning behaviour of the majority and in this
way, they determine strategies of individual households, to a large extent.
The mechanism of hysteresis, well known in a different context of dynamic
analysis of the labour market, can be easily recognized here.
Fourth, from practical point of view this reasoning can deliver important
explanations of existing huge differences between countries in the size of the
labour supply as well as in the elasticity of labour supply with respect to
taxes (or to wages). The model, which includes the complementary character
of households’ decisions, shows that two identical economies remaining in
different equilibrium states and characterized by different tax rate will not
behave identically after leveling the tax rate. Due to mechanism of hysteresis
the economy needs a very strong exogenous shock (in this case change in
taxes) to jump to the new equilibrium state. In order to eliminate the
multiple equilibria and obtain one attracting point the tax impulse must
exceed a critical level of changes.
5 Proofs
Proof (Theorem 2.1)
This theorem follows directly from theorem 4 in (Milgrom and Shannon
1994).
Proof (Theorem 2.2)
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RSCP for function F is equivalent to the SCP property for G(l, θ) ≡ F (−r, θ).
The rest follows directly from theorem 4 in (Milgrom and Shannon 1994).
Proof (Theorem 2.3)
Compare with the conditions necessary for minimization of the concave func-
tion.
Proof (Theorem 2.4)
∂F (r, θ)
∂r
=
∂U(w(1− r)(1− θ) + t, r)
∂r
= −w(1− θ)∂U(c, r)
∂c
+
∂U(c, r)
∂r
,
and:
∂2F (r, θ)
∂r∂θ
= w
∂U(c, r)
∂c
+ w2(1− θ)(1− r)∂
2U
∂c2
− w(1− r) ∂U
∂c∂r
.
Knowing additionally that r ∈ [0, 1] and that any function with arguments in
R is supermodular we may use the theorems concerning comparative statics
showed in (Amir 1996) and (Edlin and Shannon 1998).
Proof (Theorem 3.1, equilibria under complementarities)
We will show that this game is supermodular:
∂Fi(r1,r2,...,rI ,θ)
∂ri
= ∂Ui(wi(1−ri)(1−θ)+ti,ri,w−i(1−r−i)(1−θ)+t−i)∂ri =
= −wi(1− θ)∂Ui(ci,ri,c−i)∂ci +
∂Ui(ci,ri,c−i)
∂ri
,
and for j 6= i
∂2Fi(r1,r2,...,rI ,θ)
∂ri∂rj
= (1− θ)wj
(
(1− θ)wi ∂
2Ui(ci,ri,c−i)
∂ci∂cj
− ∂Ui(ci,ri,c−i)∂ri∂cj
)
.
For (1− θ)wi ∂2U∂ci∂cj − ∂
2U
∂ri∂cj
> 0 Γ is a supermodular game. Additionally:
∂2Fi(r1,r2,...,rI ,θ)
∂ri∂θ
= wi ∂Ui∂ci + (1− rj)wj
(
(1− θ)wi ∂
2Ui(ci,ri,c−i)
∂ci∂cj
+
∂Ui(ci,ri,c−i)
∂ri∂cj
)
+ (1− ri)wi
(
(1− θ)wi ∂
2Ui(ci,ri,c−i)
∂c2i
− ∂Ui(ci,ri,c−i)∂ri∂ci
)
,
i.e. for condition (2.7) the payoff function exhibits increasing differences on
(ri, θ) and given r−i. Then using the theorems 4.2.1 i 4.2.2 from (Topkis
1998) we get (i) and (ii).
We will show point (iii) (see Amir, Jakubczyk, and Knauff 2006) by
contradiction. For simplicity we will skip the parameter θ in the notation.
Assume that for a symmetric supermodular game the asymmetric equilib-
rium exists: (ai, b−i). Knowing that the game is symmetric we get that
(bi, a−i) is also the Nash equilibrium and additionally:
F ((ai, b−i)) ≥ F ((bi, b−i)), F ((bi, a−i)) ≥ F ((ai, a−i)).
Summing these two inequalities we get:
F ((ai, b−i)) + F ((bi, a−i)) ≥ F ((ai, a−i)) + F ((bi, b−i)) (5.14)
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From (i) we know that the set of the equilibria is a complete lattice. Addi-
tionally knowing that the payoff function is strictly supermodular we get:
F ((ai, b−i) ∨ (bi, a−i)) + F ((ai, b−i) ∧ (bi, a−i)) =
= F ((ai, a−i)) + F ((bi, b−i)) > F ((bi, a−i)) + F ((ai, b−i)).
Comparing this inequality with (5.14) we get a contradiction.
Proof (Theorem 3.2, equilibria under substitutive strategies)
We will show point (ii) by contradiction. For simplicity we will skip the
parameter θ in the notation. Assume that there exist two symmetric Nash
equilibria (ai, a−i)<(bi, b−i). We know that:
F ((ai, a−i)) ≥ F ((bi, a−i)), F ((bi, b−i)) ≥ F ((ai, b−i)).
Strictly decreasing differences imply the function F to be strictly submodu-
lar. As a result we get:
F ((ai, b−i) ∨ (bi, a−i)) + F ((ai, b−i) ∧ (bi, a−i)) =
= F ((ai, a−i)) + F ((bi, b−i)) < F ((bi, a−i)) + F ((ai, b−i)).
Summing this inequalities we get a contradiction.
The rest of point (ii) follows directly frow the fact that the best response
function decreases (increases) with θ.
Proof (Theorem 3.4, stability of equilibria)
It follows directly from theorem 4 and 6 in (Echenique 2002).
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